Abstract: Electricity is a completely non-storable good that often faces uncertain demand. This paper studies how the vertical structure of a competitive electricity market affects its performance. In the model all firms are perfectly competitive and risk-neutral. The aggregate demand is stochastic but retail prices must be determined before the uncertainty is resolved. When producers and retailers are vertically separated, they trade with each other in a spot wholesale market. It is found that when the covariance between production quantities and marginal production costs is positive, vertical separation leads to higher prices for consumers and higher profits for producers in the short-run. The result is reversed when the covariance is negative. In the long-run, vertical separation may induce excessive or insufficient entry of producers, depending on the sign of the covariance. But in either case the separation leads to higher retail prices and lower social surplus.
Introduction
Because of the natural monopoly characteristics of electricity industry, traditional electricity firms are normally subject to intensive government regulation. The firms are usually vertically integrated, engaging in generation, transmission, distribution, and retail of electricity. Government regulation precludes market competition, therefore often results in cost inefficiency. In the last 30 years, the deregulation of electricity industries has been focusing on designing appropriate market environment so that producers and retailers can effectively compete with each other, while keeping transmission and distribution businesses under regulation. The reforms often create vertical separated electricity industries where producers and retailers trade with each other in spot wholesale markets. Since the demand for electricity is stochastic, such an industry structure often results in highly fluctuating wholesale prices. Another possible deregulation approach is creating multiple competing electricity firms that directly serve final consumers. Such an industry structure eliminates spot wholesale markets. An interesting question is how the vertical structure of the industry influences the market performances. This paper considers a perfectly competitive electricity market where the aggregate demand is stochastic. Electricity is completely non-storable. Electricity production incurs variable marginal costs, but retailing incurs constant marginal costs and zero fixed costs.
Linear retail prices are determined before the demand uncertainty is resolved. A seller has to fully satisfy the demands from its contracted consumers. Under vertical integration, producers directly sell to final consumers. Under vertical separation, retailers purchase from producers through a spot wholesale market, and then sell to final consumers. The generation facilities of the industry are fixed in the short-run but are adjustable in the long-run.
This model suggests that when the covariance between electricity outputs and marginal production costs is positive, the separation of production and retail results in higher price for consumers and higher profits for producers in the short-run. Under vertical separation, the spot wholesale market serves as a commitment device for the producers to attain more revenue through a multiplicative effect. Indeed, the producer profits rise significantly when the aggregate demand is high because they not only sell more but also sell at higher wholesale prices. When the demand is low and thus the wholesale price is low, the loss is relatively small because the output is also low. The net effect of the uncertainty on the (expected) producer profits is positive compared to that under vertical integration. The result is reversed when the covariance is negative.
In the long-run producers enter or exit the market until their economic profits are driven to zero. Vertical separation induces excessive entry of producers to the industry when the covariance between production quantities and marginal costs is positive, because the separation exaggerates the profitability of the production business. The result is reversed when the covariance is negative. But in either case, the suboptimality of market entry leads to higher retail price, lower consumer surplus and lower social surplus. Therefore from the perspective of welfare economics, vertical separation might be inferior to vertical integration in the long-run.
There is a theoretical literature on the competition of electricity markets. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) consider oligopolistic markets where firms face uncertain demand. The firms compete by offering continuous (Klemperer et al., 1989) or discrete (von der Fehr et al., 1993) supply functions. Klemperer et al. (1989) find that in the absence of uncertainty, there exists an enormous multiplicity of equilibria in supply functions, but uncertainty dramatically reduces the set of equilibria. Under uncertainty, they prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in supply functions for a symmetric oligopoly and give sufficient conditions for uniqueness. von der Fehr et al.
(1993) study the price competition in the deregulated UK electricity market with an auction model. They show that under the existing institutional set-up there is likely to be above marginal cost pricing, and inefficient dispatching may result. It is also found that for a wide range of demand distributions, pure strategy equilibria will not exist with step supply functions. In contrast, the strategic interaction among firms does not exist in the current paper since the firms are price-takers.
Another important theoretic paper is Allaz and Vila (1993) , which shows that the existence of future markets may increase the market efficiency in a Cournot setting.
Through long-term contracts, generators sell part of their electricity before the opening of spot markets at fixed prices. As a result, generators will behave more competitively in the spot market. The spot market outcome approaches the perfectly competitive market outcome as the number of rounds of contracting gets large. Based on this theory, Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia (2008) simulate electricity prices that define bounds on static oligopoly equilibria, and find that vertically integrated wholesalers, or those with long-term contracts, have substantially less incentive to raise wholesale prices. Gans and Wolak (2008) offer a prospective and retrospective quantitative assessment of the impact of a "passive" vertical integration between a large electricity retailer and a large electricity generator in the Australian National Electricity Market. The integration is "passive" in the sense that the acquiring retailer is required not to involve in the day-to-day bidding and contract trading of the acquired generator, with representation only at the Board of Directors level. The argument is that a passive vertical acquisition provides the acquiring retailer with a non-contractual natural hedge against fluctuations in the wholesale market.
This causes the retailer to reduce its demand for fixed-price forward contracts which in turn reduces the total volume of such contracts held by generators. Therefore the generators increase their incentive to exercise unilateral market power in the spot wholesale electricity market, which raises the equilibrium market prices. A feature of these papers is that the industry has a "hybrid" vertical structure, where a producer can choose to sell through a spot wholesale market, or directly to final consumers.
Industrial organization theorists have paid considerable attention to vertical separation under aggregate demand uncertainty, e.g., Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1996) , Dana and Spier (2001) , and Marvel and Wang (2009) . The studies show how vertical integration corrects the distortion caused by demand uncertainty. The models usually assume that the products in consideration can be produced in advance and inventoried by retailers for possible future sale. Hence the products can be stored for at least "one period". In contrast, electricity cannot be inventoried at all, which means aggregate supply must match aggregate demand in real time. Nevertheless, the current paper also suggests that vertical integration improves the coordination between upstream and downstream firms when the aggregate demand is uncertain.
Led by Chile in 1982 and the United Kingdom in 1990, many countries have reformed their electricity industries in order to improve performances. Some of the reforms are viewed rather successful, e.g., the Nordic market (including Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). Amundsen and Bergman (2006) suggest that the successful reform in the Nordic market is attributed to a simple but sound market design, successful dilution of market power, strong political support of deregulation, and high proportion of hydroelectric energy.
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Other reforms might be disappointing, e.g., the British market (Green and Newbery 1992) and Californian market (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002) before 2001. Green and Newbery (1992) find that the competition in supply schedules in the British electricity spot market implies a high markup on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses. Wolak (2003) The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a simple model of competitive electricity market. Section II characterizes the short-run equilibria of the market, and Section III concerns the long-run equilibria. Section IV discusses some possible extensions of the model. Section V concludes the paper.
I. An electricity market
Consider an electricity market that is perfectly competitive at both production and retail stages. The production cost of an electricity producer is C(q), which is positive and
The marginal transmission and distribution costs through a public grid are normalized to zero. Retailers have zero fixed costs and constant marginal costs, which are also normalized to zero.
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Electricity is assumed to be completely non-storable.
There is a continuum of consumers. Their demands for electricity are homogenous, stochastic, and completely inelastic. The individual demands are perfectly correlated with each other. The aggregate demand follows cumulative distribution ( )
. Without loss of generality, the number of consumers is assumed to be N. Hence the demand of each
, and her expected demand is exactly 1.
All firms are risk-neutral. The sale contracts are signed before the demand uncertainty is resolved. Consumers only accept fixed prices. A contract specifies a linear retail price, but not the quantity of transaction. A firm can choose the number of consumers to serve.
Once the contracts are signed, the firm must fully satisfy the demand of its consumers. In the case of vertical integration, producers directly sell to final consumers. In the case of vertical separation, retailers purchase from producers through a spot wholesale market and then sell to consumers. In this model the role of competitive retailers is transforming the uncertain spot wholesale prices into a constant retail price.
2 If the producer has a capacity limit Q, then we have
II. Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run, the number of firms and the production facility of the industry are fixed.
We normalize the number of price-taking producers to 1 in order to simplify the explanation.
This simplification is not restrictive as long as the producers are homogenous. I will briefly demonstrate how the model can be extended to the case with multiple producers at the end of this section.
Vertical integration
Because the consumer's demand is uncertain, an integrated electricity producer cannot determine the exact production quantity when the sale contracts are signed, but it can choose the number of consumers to serve. The equilibrium of the market can be characterized by a price I p that clears the market. Since the consumer's demands are absolutely inelastic, the equilibrium price should be the lowest price that induces the producer to serve all the consumers.
In equilibrium the producer's expected revenue from serving the "last" consumer (i.e., the expected marginal revenue) should be equal to the expected cost of serving that consumer (i.e., the expected marginal cost). Since each consumer's expected demand is 1, the producer's expected marginal revenue is just 
The producer would be willing to serve more than ( ) p must be given before the demand uncertainty is resolved. Thus it is a predetermined but not an "expected" selling price.
Given the equilibrium price, the producer's expected profit is
Vertical separation
Under vertical separation there is a spot wholesale market where electricity producers and retailers trade with each other. The competitive spot wholesale price equals to the marginal production cost ( ) MC q , which is random since the quantity-demanded q is uncertain. If the aggregate demand turns out to be q, then the transaction value in the wholesale market is ) (q qMC . Hence the producer's expected revenue, or the retailers' expected total cost, is
Since the competitive retailers have constant return to scale, even the short-run equilibrium retail price S p should allow the retailers to break even, i.e.,
The equilibrium retail price is thus
The producer's expected short-run profit is
We can see that if the marginal production cost ( ) MC q is increasing, then the producer could attain a higher price (for all its output) when demand is higher, and vice versa. This is a multiplicative effect on its revenue. Denote
When [ , ] e q x x ∈ , we can write ( ) 
If ( ) MC q is increasing, then the first integral of (7) Figure 1 illustrates the case when e q x < . Since the spot wholesale prices are always higher than the average production costs, the producer obtains positive profit. This is the case when the industry has "insufficient" production capacity.
Comparison
Now we compare expression (2) and (5) and see how the vertical structure affects the producer's profit in the short-run. Before presenting the main proposition of this section, we introduce a simple lemma about covariance, whose proof is omitted. 
Proof:
The last step uses Lemma 1 and expression (2). Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 suggests that if the covariance between electricity outputs and marginal production costs is positive, then the producer earns more profit under vertical separation than under vertical integration. Hence vertical separation is better for the producers in the short-run. The result is reversed if the covariance is negative. According to Schmidt (2003) , a sufficient but not necessary condition for the covariance being positive is for the marginal production cost ) (q C being increasing. In the real world the marginal production cost for electricity is typically increasing, since high-cost generators are dispatched when demand is high. Hence vertical separation tends to increase power producers' profits in the short-run.
With increasing marginal production cost, vertical separation allows the producers to charge high prices when demand is high. This creates a multiplicative (high price multiplied by high quantity) effect on the producer's revenue. Although the producers receive low wholesale prices when demand is low, the impact on the profitability is relatively small because the quantity-supplied is low. Therefore the spot wholesale market actually serves as a commitment device for the producers to obtain more favorable terms of trading.
The situation is reversed when the covariance is negative, since the spot wholesale price tends to be low when the demand turns out to be high.
The relationship between vertical separation and profitability reminds us of the "strategic vertical separation" in bilateral oligopoly markets, as addressed by Bonanno and Vickers (1988) , Rey and Stiglitz (1988) , and others. But the mechanisms are actually different. In a bilateral oligopoly with linear wholesale prices, vertical separation makes upstream firms perceive less elastic demands, and thus drives up the final prices. But in the current story, retailers have no market power, which means the demand elasticity argument does not apply.
From expressions (1) and (2), the equilibrium price under vertical integration is
And from expressions (4) and (5), the equilibrium retail price under vertical separation is
Hence I S p p > if and only if S I π π > . Indeed, when demand is absolutely inelastic, the vertical structure only influences income distribution, but not social welfare in the short-run.
Hence the consumers pay higher prices when and only when the producer makes more profits. In this example, vertical separation raises the electricity price (or the profit of the producer) by 5.56% in the short-run.
Particularly, we have
S I π π > when ( ,( ))
Multiple competitive producers
We have assumed that there is one price-taking producer in the market. This might cause some confusion since it is certainly impossible for a single firm to be a price-taker.
Nevertheless, the short-run analyses can be easily applied to the case with multiple homogenous producers when symmetric equilibria exist. Suppose there are m competitive producers. Each has a cost function of ( ) C q . The games played in the market are virtually the same as before.
In the symmetric equilibrium under vertical integration, the market price I p (i.e., the marginal revenue from serving the last consumer) equals to the producers' expected marginal cost of serving the last consumer. Therefore we have ( ) ( ) 
Comparing expression (13) and (14), one can see that the analyses are virtually parallel. In the case of symmetric short-run equilibrium, we do have the result that vertical separation leads to higher retail price and producer profits.
Finally, to prepare for the discussion of long-run equilibrium in the next section, we give a lemma about short-run equilibrium here.
Lemma 2: In a symmetric short-run equilibrium under vertical integration, a producer's profit decreases with the number of producers in the market.
Proof: First, the profit of a price-taking producer is non-decreasing with the market price.
Second, under vertical integration the equilibrium price must decrease when a new producer enters the market, otherwise the aggregate quantity-supplied would exceed the aggregate quantity-demanded. Hence an entrant lowers the equilibrium profit of an incumbent producer. Q.E.D.
III. Long-run equilibrium
In the long-run electricity producers enter or exit the market until the equilibrium profits are driven to zero. Therefore the number of producers is endogenously determined. As in previous section we only consider symmetric equilibrium. Denote the equilibrium number of producers under vertical integration as 
Vertical integration
Under vertical integration, if a producer faces a demand that follows distribution ( ) K q on interval [ , ] y y , then for given market price p the producer's profit is
Define the "expected average cost" (McKean, 1969) of the producer as 
One can see from (15) and (16) that for given distribution function ( ) K q and cost function ) (q C , the price which allows zero profit for the producer is exactly AC .
The long-run competitive equilibrium under vertical integration satisfies two conditions. First, each producer's expected average cost AC equals to the equilibrium price. Hence the producers can break even. Second, given cost function ( ) C q , each producer chooses the number of consumers such that its AC is minimized. Otherwise it would be replaced by other producers with lower AC .
Denote the expected average cost of an integrated producer that serves n consumers as
In words, it is efficient for a producer to serve * n consumers. As suggested above, the long-run equilibrium price must be
as long as the equilibrium exists. The equilibrium number of producers is thus
Since each consumer's expected demand is 1, each producer's expected total cost is * * ( ) n AC n , and the expected production cost of the industry is * ( ) N AC n . When the industry production is optimally allocated among the * N n producers, the expected production cost of the industry is minimized. In other words, the long-run equilibrium under vertical integration is socially optimal.
Vertical Separation
Assume that each producer employs one price-taking retailer without loss of generality.
The long-run equilibrium number of producers 
From (20) and (21) 
Hence the long-run equilibrium retail price under vertical separation equals to the expected average cost of each producer. Each producer serves S N m consumers.
Comparison
Based on the discussion in previous subsections, we present the main result of this section in the following proposition. Proof: Consider first the case of ( , Since marginal production cost is typically increasing, vertical separation typically leads to excessive entry of producers or excessive investment in power generation in the real world.
Proposition 2 shows that vertical integration in an electricity market improves the coordination between production and retail even when the market is perfectly competitive.
As long as the transaction cost of integration is low enough, the vertical integration benefits consumers without hurting anyone else in the long run.
IV. Discussions

Fixed Retail Pricing
Consumers are supposed to only accept fixed prices in this paper. This assumption is usually satisfied in sales to small users, probably because fixed pricing is technically simple, and makes it easy for consumers to monitor their electricity expenditures. Actually the modeling of vertical separation is equivalent to that where producers directly sell to final consumers via variable prices that equal to the marginal production costs. If all consumers are willing to accept variable rates for their electricity consumption, the role of retailers becomes trivial. Hence from the perspective of producers, vertical separation does not make any difference. Hence the current model can be viewed as considering the difference between fixed pricing, which is equivalent to the case of vertical integration, and variable pricing, which is equivalent to the case of vertical separation. It suggests that integrated electricity producers prefer variable pricing but consumers prefer fixed pricing in the short-run. The social surplus is higher under fixed pricing. In the long-run variable pricing induces excessive or insufficient entry of producers and therefore leads to higher average prices for consumers and lower social surplus.
Nevertheless, fixed pricing might be inefficient when the demand is elastic. For example, when the demand is high and thus the marginal production cost is high, it is socially desirable for consumers to accordingly reduce their usage. But fixed pricing cannot provide an economic incentive for them to do so. Therefore the net effect of fixing pricing on social welfare in the long-run is unsure.
Endogenous market structure
It can be shown that vertical separation cannot be an equilibrium outcome when there is no transaction cost in vertical integration. If producers can choose to sell directly to consumers or through retailers, from the equilibrium under vertical separation, an individual producer has incentive to integrate downward. Indeed, in the short-run equilibrium under vertical separation, each of the m producers serve 1 m of the consumers at price 
Market power
This paper only considers the case of perfect competition. Indeed, competition is crucial for the success of an electricity industry reform because market power in this market often invites significant price increase and/or opportunistic behaviors. Nevertheless, real-world electricity firms often have some market power. For instance, in the UK in 1993, the market shares of three investor-owned generators, National Power, Powergen, and Nuclear Electric, were 52%, 33% and 15% respectively. Such a high level of market concentration might have helped to generate the disappointing performance of the UK deregulation before 2001.
In contrast, the largest power producer of the Nordic market, Vattenfall, only takes a market share of 17%. Vattenfall is wholly owned by Swedish government.
In a market with oligopolistic vertically-integrated producers, the producers may sell to consumers via fixed prices or variable prices. In the case of variable pricing, the producers typically charge high prices in high demand states, and vice versa. In practice producers typically compete by choosing supply functions (hour-ahead, day-ahead, etc.) . The cases fall to the models of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) or von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) .
When producers have market power, their supply curves should be above their marginal cost curves, as shown in Figure 2 . The smaller the market powers are, the closer the supply curves are to the marginal cost curves.
Based on the model of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , one might consider the case where oligopolistic producers offer supply curves to competitive retailers. The retailers sell to consumers via fixed prices. In such a model the producers have to take the zero profit condition of the retailers into consideration. We conjecture that vertical integration not only internalizes the externalities caused by the strategic interaction between producers and retailers (Winter, 1993; and others) , but also improves the vertical coordination of the industry. Details are left for future studies.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper captures two critical features of electricity markets, which are the non-storability of the goods and the uncertainty of the aggregate demand. The main argument is that the separation of production and retail does affect the performance of a competitive electricity market. The model demonstrates that when the covariance between electricity outputs and marginal production costs is positive, then the separation of production and retail results in higher electricity price and producer profits in the short-run. The reverse is true when the covariance is negative. In the long-run, vertical separation induces excessive or insufficient entry of power producers to the market, and thus results in higher electricity price and lower social surplus. The findings suggest that governments should encourage vertical integration or long-term contractual relationship between electricity producers and retailers, when the associated transaction costs are not too high.
